Court Upholds Controversial Contingent Fee Agreement In Estate Case

A 40 percent contingent-fee agreement between New York law firm Graubard Miller and Alice Lawrence, the 83-year-old widow of real estate developer Sylvan Lawrence, was not unconscionable on its face, an appellate court said Tuesday, even though the agreement was executed in the final months of a decades-long estate litigation in which the firm had already received $18 million in hourly fees and three partners had further requested and received $5 million in "gifts."

In Lawrence v. Graubard Miller et al., a 4-1 majority of the New York Appellate Division, 1st Department denied Ms. Lawrence's motion to dismiss Graubard Miller's petition to compel payment of the contingent fee and said further proceedings would be needed to determine the propriety of the arrangement.

"[W]hile at first blush such agreement might arguably seem excessive and invite skepticism, before any determination regarding unconscionability can be made, the circumstances underlying the agreement must be fully developed, including any discussions leading to the agreement, as well as the prospects at that time of successfully concluding the litigation in favor of Mrs. Lawrence," Justice Richard T. Andrias wrote for a majority that included Justices David Friedman, George D. Marlow and Eugene Nardelli.

But in a blistering dissent, Justice James M. Catterson said he would not only have found the fee agreement invalid on its face but would also have referred the Graubard Miller lawyers to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee.

"Regardless of the procedural aspects of the parties' negotiations, no court can condone such an exorbitant fee," Catterson wrote.

Ms. Lawrence first retained the law firm, then known as Graubard Moskovitz McGoldrick Dannett & Horowitz in 1983, to represent her in a suit against Seymour Cohn, her late husband's brother, business partner and executor.

At the time of Mr. Lawrence's death in 1981, the brothers held a 12-million-square-foot real estate portfolio that included the former Port Authority building at 111 Eighth Ave. and a number of Wall Street office towers. It was estimated to be worth over $1 billion. Ms. Lawrence, who inherited 75 percent of her husband's interest, sought the portfolio's sale, but Cohn, who died in 2003, long opposed her.

Over the next 20 years, some $350 million was distributed from the estate, but the litigation dragged on until a final settlement was reached in May 2005 by which Cohn's estate would pay Ms. Lawrence and her children $105 million. Graubard Miller is seeking 40 percent of this amount, or around $42 million. Ms. Lawrence has sought rescission of the agreement as well as the return of all previous fees on the grounds of unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty.

Though contingent fees of such magnitude are not uncommon in personal injury cases, they are rarer in estate cases. Moreover, such deals normally date from the beginning of the litigation and are in lieu of hourly fees, meaning a law firm bringing a case on a contingent-fee basis normally faces a risk of nonrecovery.

But Graubard Miller's contingent-fee deal was signed in January 2005, only months before the settlement. The 1983 retainer agreement in effect prior to that only specified hourly billing. In his dissent, Justice Catterson said the contingent fee might have been reasonable if agreed upon at the beginning of the case or if the firm had agreed to refund its previous fees.

"Without the costs and risks generally associated with contingency fee arrangements, such a fee agreement is nothing short of plain greed," he wrote.

The contingent-fee arrangement was proposed to Ms. Lawrence by Graubard Miller partner C. Daniel Chill. In 1998, Chill had also allegedly asked Ms. Lawrence to pay him and two other partners multimillion-dollar "gifts," telling her that such payments were typical in longstanding attorney-client relationships.

Ms. Lawrence subsequently wrote a personal check to Chill for $2 million and also wrote $1.6 million and $1.5 million checks respectively to Graubard Miller partners Elaine Reich and Steven Mallis. At Chill's alleged request, she also paid $2.7 million in gift taxes. She is also seeking the return of these payments.

But the appellate court majority said the propriety of both the retainer agreement and the gifts depended upon Ms. Lawrence's capacity at the time she entered into it, and that her advanced age was not dispositive of the issue. In its decision, the court cited the recommendation of a referee appointed by former Manhattan Surrogate Renee Roth.

The referee, former Court of Appeals Judge Howard Levine, had concluded that there was no legal authority for finding a contingent fee unconscionable solely on the basis of its size and without any inquiry into the discussions between client and attorney.

Levine was also last month appointed one of the administrators of the late Brooke Astor's estimated $190 million estate. Tuesday, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office announced criminal fraud and larceny charges against Astor's son and his former lawyer.

In Ms. Lawrence's court filings, she claimed her capacity at the time she agreed to the contingent fee was diminished because of a recent surgery, for which she was taking pain medication.

Graubard Miller's lawyer, Mark Zauderer of Flemming Zulack Williamson Zauderer, said Tuesday that Ms. Lawrence was a sophisticated woman who had entered into the fee agreement with full knowledge. He said the firm was delighted with the 1st Department's decision.

"They affirmed Graubard's right to a hard-earned fee in a very complex case," he said.

Leslie D. Corwin of Greenberg Traurig, the lawyer for Ms. Lawrence, said Tuesday that he strongly agreed with Justice Catterson's dissent and felt the case should be decided on the law, with no need to elicit further facts. Though he said he was still conferring with his client on her options, he said the likelihood of an appeal was strong.

Source: Law.com

Lawyer Who Pressure Widow to Change Will May Be Subject to Punitive Damages

From this week's New Jersey Law Journal. It may well be that the lawyer here did not actually do anything improper, but anyone concerned about appearances might have acted differently. Anything that even looks like it might be self-dealing should be inherently suspect and avoided:

A New Jersey attorney and his client, who last May escaped conviction on charges they unduly pressured an elderly widow to name them as executor and beneficiary of her multimillion dollar estate, now are trying to avoid punitive damages.

A New Jersey appeals court ruled last December that although Ronald Casale and his client, Dr. Ronald Sollitto, could not be forced to pay attorney fees to the beneficiary they effectively disinherited, a jury could still assess punitive damages against them.

Last week, Casale and a lawyer for Sollitto argued to the state Supreme Court that to allow such a remedy would clog the courts and drastically alter the law of trusts and estates.

The case, In the Matter of the Estate of Madeline Stockdale, A-121-06, stems from a challenge to a 2000 will drafted by Casale that named Sollitto, his friend and longtime client, as the chief beneficiary of Madeline Stockdale's estate and Casale the sole executor. The challenger was the Spring Lake First Aid Squad, which under an earlier will would have received most of the estate.

Casale drafted the later will for Stockdale, a nonagenarian, while she was in a rehabilitation facility recovering from a hip fracture. It was executed on Jan. 3, 2000, a day before she had throat surgery.

The same day, Stockdale also signed a real estate contract -- drawn up by Spring Lake, N.J., solo Thomas Foley on instructions from Sollitto -- by which she agreed to sell Sollitto her Spring Lake home for $1.3 million. The contract required only a $1,000 initial deposit, followed by a second deposit of $56,000, with Stockdale taking back a purchase money mortgage for the rest. The will drafted by Casale excused Sollitto's obligation to pay off the mortgage, since as residuary beneficiary the money would go to him anyway.

Stockdale also gave Sollitto power of attorney over her affairs. Stockdale died three months later.

Superior Court Judge Ronald Reisner of Monmouth County, N.J., refused to admit the 2000 will to probate, saying it appeared to be the product of "sharp dealing" by Casale and Sollitto. He also refused to enforce the sale of the house.

Reisner denied the squad's claim for punitive damages but awarded it $1,193,726 in counsel fees against Sollitto and Casale, relying on In the Matter of the Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282 (2003). That case held that an estate executor or trustee who benefits from undue influence to the detriment of the estate may be required to pay counsel fees.

The Appellate Division reversed, holding Niles did not apply because Sollitto was not an executor or fiduciary, neither he nor Casale had depleted the estate and there was no attorney-client relationship between the squad and Casale.

However, the court remanded for reconsideration of punitive damages, finding Reisner apparently had mistakenly thought the fee award was the equivalent of a punitive award. Casale and Sollitto appealed.

On Oct. 9, Sollitto's lawyer, Frederick Dennehy, urged the state supreme court to reject the squad's claim for punitive damages and counsel fees.

"The question of fee shifting hovers like a ghost over all settlement negotiations" in disputes over wills and estates, said Dennehy, of Woodbridge, N.J.'s Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer.

"Punitive damages are a much larger issue," he added. "We have the possibility that in ... virtually every will contest, there will be an application and a claim to entitlement for punitive damages."

The result, said Dennehy, would be to clog the courts with estates that cannot be settled because of the possibility of fee shifting and punitive damages.

"Why are you so fearful?" asked Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto.

"This would be a seismic change in the law of estates and trusts," Dennehy replied.

Rivera-Soto wasn't convinced, asking Dennehy why rules concerning fee shifting and punitive damages should not apply in will contests the way they do in tort claims.

Dennehy said those rules could apply if there were clear indications of fraud, but not of undue influence.

"Undue influence covers a very wide spectrum," Dennehy said.

Casale, arguing pro se, said Niles did not apply here because there was no diminution of the estate as in Niles. "In Niles, the Court had to send a message out," said Casale, a former head of the New Jersey State Bar Association's Real Property and Probate section.

Rivera-Soto asked about the circumstances under which punitive damages might be awarded. Casale said they could be available if there were compensatory damages, but since there were none in this case, punitive damages cannot be awarded, he said.

Casale added that there is no evidence he exerted influence over Stockdale.

"There was not a single finding that I exercised any undue influence," he said. "I couldn't have. I didn't know the woman long enough." On May 11, a Monmouth County jury hung on conspiracy and theft-by-deception charges against Casale and Sollitto for allegedly bilking Stockdale out of her fortune.

Casale told the justices they would send a bad signal to the bar by ruling in favor of the rescue squad.

"I know a lot of practitioners who will stop doing wills and estates," he said. "It will just be too risky."

The rescue squad's lawyer, Spring Lake solo William Gearty, said the two did exert undue influence over an elderly woman in ill health.

"They were the 'driving force,'" said Gearty, quoting Reisner, even though Sollitto was not a fiduciary. By persuading Stockdale to change her will, they engaged in a "pernicious tort."

Several justices suggested it may not be possible to rule in the rescue squad's favor because there is no indication it suffered financially.

Gearty disagreed. "It's difficult for the squad to accept the fact that it was not harmed at all," he said. Stockdale's property is now worth about $5 million and, under the terms of her original will, the rescue squad was to be given the property after she died.

"They still don't have title to the property seven years after Mrs. Stockdale died," Gearty said.

Justice Virginia Long asked Gearty to respond to Dennehy's assertion that a ruling in the rescue squad's favor would jam up the Chancery Division with contested claims.

The court's ruling in Niles has not led to that result, said Gearty, and there is no reason to believe it would happen if the court ruled in the rescue squad's favor. "I don't see the floodgates opening in any fashion," he said. "This case is identical to Niles."


$1000 An Hour?

The Wills, Trusts & Estates blog, reflecting on recent news stories reporting that certain lawyers at large New York law firms are bow billing their clients at the rate of $1000 an hour, wonders whether any estate planners have breached that mark. I expect that it is possible that there might be trusts and estates practitioners at some large firm that has not jettisoned its practice who might bill at that level, but I tend to doubt it. In my view, as I discussed here, hourly billing is a bad practice, designed mostly to reward lawyers for spending hours on things, and not necessarily solving their problems. I believe that all lawyers, and estate planning practitioners especially, should embrace alternative billing methods, and charge their clients based upon value added and not time spent.

Let's Bury the Billable Hour

It has long been my belief that the billable hour system, bu which many attorneys charge their clients and earn their livings ( and as I do, too for some matters, by way of disclosure) creates an inherent tension between the attorney's interests and those of the client. If the attorney is being paid by the hour, doesn't he or she benefit from taking as much time as possible, or at least as much as the client will be willing to pay for, in completing a task? Of what possible benefit is this to the client? This is a primary reason that I have started to use alternative fee arrangements such flat fees and the like, for more matters, with the goal ultimately of using such arrangements in all cases. Even some in biglaw are now seeing the light. In an article in the August 2007 issue of the ABA Journal, best selling author and Chicago litigator Scoot Turow fairly well lays bare the flaws in the billable hour system. Whether Turow's large law firm colleagues follow his lead or not, however, I intend to continue to pursue a full transition to alternative fees. legal fees, like fees for any other service, should be based on value added. My clients deserve nothing less.